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Abstract 
This paper considers the implications for regulatory competition of the recent 
judgment of the European Court of Justice in Laval.  This case is potentially the 
most important decision on European labour law for a generation.  The Court 
has greatly extended the scope for judicial review of state-level labour laws on 
the grounds that they restrict freedom of movement from one member state to 
another.  It has also undermined the principle of the territorial effect of labour 
legislation and has given a strictly pre-emptive interpretation to social policy 
directives.  The Laval judgment is, however, open to attack on a number of 
grounds.  It fails to mount a coherent economic case for judicial intervention on 
the  scale  envisaged,  and  is,  more  generally,  incompatible  with  the  recent 
experimentalist or reflexive turn in European governance  represented by the 
open method of coordination.   
 
 
JEL Codes: J83, K31 
 
Keywords:  regulatory  competition,  experimentalism,  labour  law,  free 
movement of workers, Laval case. 
 
Acknowledgements 
I am grateful to Catherine Barnard for comments on an earlier draft and to the 
EU  Sixth  Research  and  Development  Framework  Programme,  Integrated 
















Further information about the Centre for Business Research can be found at the 
following address: www.cbr.cam.ac.uk   1 
‘Leaving  aside  cases  of  overt  discrimination  and  interventions 
aimed  at  favouring  certain  firms  or  modes  of  production, 
legislative and regulatory provisions may have such an impact on 
costs  and  prices  that  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  with  the 
greatest care whether, either by virtue of their own impact or by 
reason of disparities between two or more countries, some of them 
may have the effect of distorting conditions of competition among 
the national economies as a whole or in particular branches of 
economic activity…  But at the same time it will be necessary to 
identify very precisely the limits of whatever action is necessary, 





The purpose of this article is to consider the implications of Laval
2 and other 
recent decisions of the ECJ
3 for regulatory competition between the Member 
States  in  the  field  of  labour  law.    In  addition  to its  importance  for  the  law 
governing the posting of workers, Laval raises issues of an institutional nature 
concerning  the  relationship  between  Community  law  and  the  laws  of  the 
Member States.  Firstly, it seems to provide the courts, when applying the law 
of free movement, with a power to review national regulatory standards not 
simply where such standards operate above an abstractly-defined threshold of 
undue restrictiveness, but more concretely where they operate in excess of the 
standards applying in the least regulative Member State which is relevant to the 
issue at hand.  Secondly, it implies that there might be a right of economic 
actors to access the laws of this ‘least regulative’ state regardless of the precise 
location  of  their  own  activities,  as  long  as  those  activities  have  a  loose 
connection  with  the  jurisdiction  concerned  or  there  is  some  transnational 
element involved in the issue at stake.  Thirdly, Laval’s reading of the Posting 
of  Workers  Directive  seems  to  be  driven  by  a  view  that  directives  and 
regulations aiming to harmonise the laws of the Member States should be read 
as imposing maximum, not just minimum standards, at least in contexts where 
issues of free movement arise.   
 
In all these respects, Laval is a potentially ground-breaking decision.  However, 
the judgment is by no means clear on some critical points.  Sections II and III 
below explore two central issues.  The first is the question of the conditions 
under which differences in regulatory legislation across Member States can be 
said to constitute a restriction of, or barrier to, free movement, with the focus on 
the issue of the freedom to provide services which was directly raised in Laval.  
The second is the issue of how to interpret directives and regulations which aim 
to set basic common standards for the Member States, with the focus here on   2 
the Posting of Workers Directive.  In section IV the question of institutional 
structure is addressed.  Section V concludes.  
 
2. The reach of Article 49 
In Laval the Court held that industrial action taken by the Swedish construction 
workers’  trade  unions  with  the  aim  of  persuading  a  Latvian-based  service 
provider  to  sign  a  collective  agreement  in  respect  of  work  done  in  Sweden 
infringed the  provisions  of  Article  49  of  the  EC  Treaty.    Under  Article  49, 
‘restrictions on the freedom to provide services’ are prohibited ‘in respect of 
nationals of Member States who are established in a State of the Community 
other than that of the person for whom the services are intended’.  The principal 
party to the original Swedish litigation, Laval un Partneri Ltd, was a Latvian 
company which posted some of its employees to Sweden on a temporary basis, 
to carry out work on a building contract there.  The strike action began when 
Laval  refused  to  sign  a  collective  agreement  with  the  unions  representing 
Swedish  construction  workers,  as  a  preliminary  step  to  negotiating  over  the 
rates of pay which would govern the employment of the posted employees.  The 
strike was successful and the contract between Laval’s Swedish subsidiary and 
the local authority of Vaxholm for the building work was cancelled, after which 
the subsidiary entered into bankruptcy. 
 
2.1 What is a ‘restriction’ on the freedom to provide services? 
The first issue to examine here is the nature of the ‘restriction’ needed to trigger 
Article 49.  In the course of a lengthy judgment, the Court devoted just a few 
lines to the discussion of this question.  It said: 
 
[I]t must be pointed out that the right of trade unions of a Member State 
to  take  collective  action  by  which  undertakings  established  in  other 
Member States may be forced to sign the collective agreement for the 
building  sector—certain  terms  of  which  depart  from  the  legislative 
provisions  and  establish  more  favourable  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment  as  regards  the  matters  referred  to  in  Article  3(1)  first 
subparagraph (a) to (g) of Directive 96/71 and others relate to matters not 
referred to in that provision—is liable to make it less attractive, or more 
difficult, for such undertakings to carry out construction work in Sweden, 
and therefore constitutes a restriction on the freedom to provide services 
under Article 49 EC.
4 
 
We  shall  return  below  to  the  significance  of  the  Court’s  reference  to  the 
Directive in this passage.  Viewed as a statement on the meaning of Article 49, 
what does it imply?  The Court seems to have thought that it was almost beyond 
argument that there was a ‘restriction’ here; at any rate, that conclusion was   3 
simply asserted, without reasons being given.  Advocate General Mengozzi was 
slightly more expansive.  He said:  
 
[I]t  is,  in  my  opinion,  undeniable  that,  despite  the  absence  of  any 
contractual  link  between  the  defendants  in  the  main  proceedings  and 
Laval  and  despite  the  fact  that  the  collective  action  (a  blockade  and 
solidarity action) directly targeted members of the unions which are the 
defendants in the main proceedings, who had to decline to respond to any 
offer  of  recruitment  or  employment  with  Laval,  the  collective  action 
taken had the effect of compelling Laval to give up the performance of its 
contract on the Vaxholm site and the posting of Latvian workers to that 
site … The taking of such collective action, even if also directed against 
undertakings established in the territory of the Member State in question, 
is liable to give rise to significant costs for the foreign service provider, 
whatever the outcome of such action, so that in my view it constitutes a 
restriction on the freedom to provide services.
5 
 
Commentators have also more or less taken it for granted that Article 49 applied 
here.  According to Norbert Reich, for example, ‘with regard to the applicable 
Community law since Rush Portuguesa,
6 it is without doubt that the posting of 
workers of a company established in one EU country is a cross-border service to 
which Article 49 is applicable’.
7  Under Article 49, as under other provisions 
relating to freedom of movement, either a discrimination test or one based on 
restriction  can  be  applied.
8   Thus  there  is  no  need  to  show  that  the  service 
provider is being treated differently from nationals of the host state.  In Laval, 
Reich suggests, the action taken by the Swedish unions was ‘the strongest form 
of restriction; indeed, it made impossible the rendering of services by Laval in 
Sweden and caused great harm both to Laval and to the Latvian workers it had 
posted while relying on its freedom to provide services’.
9   
 
The restriction issue was addressed with equal brevity in the first case to apply 
Laval, Rüffert. The issue was whether a German regional law requiring building 
contractors to observe the minimum terms of a collective agreement governing 
public works infringed Article 49, in circumstances where the main contractor 
concerned had employed a Polish subcontractor which was paying its workers 
wages below the rate set out in the collective agreement.  On these facts there 
was, according to Advocate General Bot, ‘barely any doubt … that a restriction 
on the freedom to provide service exists’.
10  The Court did not need to go to a 
great deal of effort to reach the same conclusion.
11 
 
It is perhaps worthwhile examining in a little more detail an issue which, on 
closer inspection, turns out to be far from doubt-free.  In what sense, precisely,   4 
did the collective action impose costs which, as the Court put, made it ‘more 
difficult’ or ‘less attractive’ for Laval to operate in Sweden?  More difficult or 
less attractive than what?  There are only three possibilities: (1) more difficult 
than if the law allowing the industrial action had not existed; (2) more difficult 
in relation to the situation faced by Swedish firms; and (3) more difficult in 
relation to the situation which would have prevailed had Latvian law and/or 
Latvian collective agreements applied.   
 
Let us consider the first possibility.  Strikes, if successful, and labour laws, if 
they  allow  industrial  action,  inevitably  make  it  potentially  more  costly  for 
employers affected by them to do business.  Thus labour laws which subject 
foreign service providers to the possibility of strike action, and such action itself, 
can be viewed as  making it less attractive for them to do business in other 
Member States.  Laval was subject to a restriction simply because Swedish law 
permitted industrial action to be taken against it, action of the kind allowed was 
taken, and it was effective; indeed, the more effective the industrial action was, 
from a trade union perspective, the more likely it was to constitute a restriction.   
 
If this first definition of ‘restriction’ applies, it would amount to saying that a 
foreign service provider, simply because it was foreign, was entitled to have 
local labour laws disallowed in its favour, unless those laws could be justified 
by the host state.  Evidently, this is an extremely broad test.  It would enable 
any labour law provision which was in any way effective to be subjected to 
judicial review under Community law.  However, if the firm was subject to a 
higher regulatory standard in its home state, it is hard to see how the imposition 
of the law of the host state could amount to a ‘restriction’ affecting the cross-
border flow of services.  Would a Swedish firm providing services in Latvia be 
entitled to have Latvian labour law disapplied in favour, not of Swedish law, but 
of a situation in which there was no regulation whatsoever?  This possibility 
cannot be ruled out, given the broad and imprecise formulations used by the 
Court in Laval
12, but if Community law goes this far, it is hard to see where it 
would stop. 
 
The other two suggested tests are comparative tests in the sense of involving an 
assessment  of  the  costs  imposed  upon  employers  by  different  regulatory 
regimes.  The second interpretation contrasts the position of Swedish firms with 
foreign ones.  If foreign firms are subjected to a greater burden than those in the 
host state, there is, in principle, a situation of discrimination, either direct or 
indirect.    This  could  happen  in  various  ways:  the  foreign  firm  could,  for 
example, be subjected to a ‘double burden’ by virtue of the need to comply with 
two different sets of rules, or to registration requirements which imposed two 
sets of costs or expenses.
13  Discrimination is not a necessary condition for the   5 
application of Article 49 but it is a sufficient one.  However, it does not describe 
the situation in Laval, since in that case the unions were requiring of Laval what 
they  required  of  Swedish-based  employers,  namely  that  it  should  sign  a 
collective agreement with a view to negotiating over pay and conditions.
14  It is 
possible  that  a  double  burden  might  have  arisen  in  respect  of  insurance 
payments which Laval would have been required to make had it signed the 
proposed agreement.  This is one of the reasons given by the Advocate General 
for his ruling that Article 49 applied to the case.
15  However, both he and the 
Court thought that there was a potential breach of Article 49 for other reasons, 
which we will now explore.   
 
These reasons are linked to the third meaning of ‘restriction’ identified above: 
Laval was subjected to an unduly restrictive regime because of the additional 
costs it would have incurred if it had had to pay Swedish, as opposed to Latvian, 
wages.    This  would  have  been  the  likely  consequence  of  signing  up  to  a 
Swedish collective agreement.  As Advocate General Mengozzi put it, Laval 
was  arguing  that  ‘only  Latvian  legislation  and  collective  agreements  are 
applicable  to  the  posting  so  that,  as  a  result,  the  Swedish  trade  unions  are 
deprived of the possibility of seeking to compel Laval, through collective action, 
to sign the [relevant] collective agreement’.
16   
 
The point comes out more starkly in Rüffert.  According to the referring court, 
the  issue  was  whether  service  providers  in  the  position  of  the  Polish 
subcontractor  should  ‘lose  the  competitive  advantage  which  they  enjoy  by 
reason of their lower wage costs’;
17 as far as the workers were concerned. The 
national court also thought that ‘the obligation to pay the collective agreed wage 
does not bring about actual equality with German workers but instead prevents 
them from being employed in Germany because their employer is unable to 
exploit his advantage in terms of labour costs’.
18  In the words of Advocate 
General Bot, Article 49 was relevant here because the German law in question 
imposed  ‘on  service  providers  established  in  another  Member  State  where 
minimum  rates  of  pay  are  lower  an  additional  economic  burden  that  may 
prohibit, impede or render less attractive the provision of their services in the 
host state’ (emphasis added).
19  The Court agreed with this, but did not agree 
with the Advocate General’s argument that the application of the German law 
was justifiable in the circumstances. 
 
Laval and Rüffert between them establish a presumption of ‘regime portability’: 
Article 49 protects the right of the foreign service provider to apply the law 
and/or agreements of its country of origin, that is to say, the law of the home 
state, in preference to that of the host state, where the latter imposes a higher 
regulatory burden, unless those laws can pass a justification test.  The concept   6 
of regime portability is closely related to the ‘country of origin principle’ which 
originally formed part of the Services Directive.
20  The Services Directive was 
amended in its final draft stages in order to remove reference to the country of 
origin principle and to ensure that none of the provisions of the Directive would 
undermine  the  territorial  application  of  labour  law  rules  and  provisions 
collective  agreements.
21   The  effect  of  Laval  and  Rüffert  is,  in  effect,  to 
circumvent  this  derogation  and  to  revive  the  country  of  origin  principle  in 
relation  to  labour  law,  but  now  with  the  added  force  of  a  Treaty  provision 
(Article 49) which is capable of having horizontal direct effect at least against 
private regulatory bodies including trade unions.
22   
 
2.2.    The  scope  of  regime  portability:  the  need  for  a  transnational 
dimension 
If a principle of regime portability is the effect of Laval, the next critical issue is 
to determine the scope of that principle. As we have seen, the free movement 
provisions of the Treaty can only be invoked to challenge a rule or practice 
where the restriction to which it gives rise has a transnational or cross-border 
element.
 23  But what exactly does a transnational element mean in practice? 
 
A good place to start in answering this question is the dispute in Laval itself.  
Who precisely was providing services to whom?  The contract for the building 
work was between Laval’s subsidiary, a company called L&P Baltic Bygg AB 
(hereinafter ‘Baltic’), and the town of Vaxholm.  Baltic seems, on the face of it, 
to have been an undertaking established under Swedish law.  Whichever one of 
the possible tests for determining the domicile of a corporation is used—the test 
of incorporation, or that of the main site of the undertaking’s operations or head 
office (the so-called ‘real seat’)
24—Baltic must have been a Swedish company, 
albeit one whose share capital was entirely held by its foreign parent, Laval.  
Laval looks very much like a case in which the service provider (Baltic) was not 
established  in  a  Member  State  other  than  the  one  in  which  the  services  in 
question were being supplied.   
 
Was the parent company Laval un Partneri Ltd, which was established in Latvia, 
providing services to the town of Vaxholm?  No: this can only have been the 
case if the parent and subsidiary are to be treated as the same undertaking for 
this purpose.  Such a view is not by any means implausible; they were part of 
the same corporate ‘group’, if that term is understood to include companies 
linked by a common ownership or in a parent-subsidiary relationship, as these 
two were.  But if the veil of corporate personality is to be lifted in this way, it 
does not necessarily aid Laval, for the reason that any such ‘group undertaking’ 
could  just  as  plausibly  be  treated  as  an  undertaking  established  in  Sweden, 
through the subsidiary, as in Latvia, through the parent.     7 
 
This last point was argued by the Swedish trade unions, as part of their claim 
that the reference for a preliminary ruling was inadmissible.  Their argument 
was rejected by the Court on the grounds that the ‘factual context’ of the case 
was  such  that  it  was  not  ‘artificial’  to  see  the  dispute  as  giving  rise  to  the 
questions, involving the interpretation of Article 49 of the Treaty and of the 
Posting of Workers Directive, which the national court had referred to it.
25  The 
relevant elements of the ‘factual context’ were three-fold: the dispute turned on 
the terms and conditions ‘applicable to Latvian workers posted by Laval to a 
building site in Sweden’; the work was ‘carried out by an undertaking belonging 
to the Laval group’; and, following the collective action mounted by the unions, 
‘the  posted  workers  returned  to  Latvia’.
26    In  referring  to  Baltic  as  an 
‘undertaking belonging to the Laval group’ the Court seems to have taken the 
view that the Swedish subsidiary was a separate undertaking from its parent.  
What it did not do was clearly indicate what it thought the nationality of Baltic’s 
establishment was. 
 
It  is  perhaps  not  surprising  that  the  Court  rejected  the  argument  on  the 
admissibility of the preliminary reference.  The questions set by the national 
court were, clearly, of importance in the context of the wider question of the 
posting of workers.  The problem comes in trying to understand exactly what 
dispute the Court thought it was dealing with.  Was Baltic established under 
Latvian law and, if not, in what sense was Laval, which clearly was a Latvian 
company, providing services on a cross-national basis?  This is not an issue 
which goes to the question of the admissibility of a preliminary reference under 
Article 234, but to the substance of Articles 49 and 50. 
 
Perhaps Laval was providing services, not to the town of Vaxholm, but to its 
own subsidiary.  This is possible, but the point is not clear.  Under Article 50, 
‘services shall be considered to be “services” within the meaning of the Treaty 
where they are normally provided for remuneration’.  There is no evidence of 
there being a contract between Laval and Baltic under which it undertook to 
hire out its own employees to its subsidiary, or of it receiving remuneration 
from Baltic for doing so.  
 
We must assume that the Court did not think it was deciding a hypothetical case.  
If that is so, a number of possibilities arise. One is that the Court tacitly lifted 
the veil of corporate personality, discovered that Laval and Baltic were part of 
the same corporate group, and (tacitly again) assigned Latvian nationality to 
them both.  A second possibility is that Laval’s involvement in the process as 
Baltic’s parent company—even though Laval itself was not the provider—was 
sufficient to confer upon the dispute a transnational element within Article 49.    8 
A third possibility is that the events of the Vaxholm case might deter Laval, and 
similar overseas companies, from operating in Sweden in future (even though in 
this case, Laval chose to act through a Swedish subsidiary and might have done 
so again).   
 
A fourth possibility is that the Court was applying a special rule in the context 
of the posting of workers.  This possibility is not apparent from the Court’s 
judgment, but the issue was discussed by Advocate General Mengozzi.  The 
Advocate General pointed out that that Article 1(3)(b) of the Posting of Workers 
Directive includes within the scope of that measure a situation in which ‘the 
business of an undertaking established in a Member State … posts a worker to 
the territory of another Member State, to an establishment or to an undertaking 
owned by the group, provided that there is an employment relationship between 
the  undertaking  making  the  posting  and  the  worker  during  the  period  of 
posting’.
27  Later in his Opinion the Advocate General advanced the view that 
the Directive ‘represents a specific interpretation of Article 49 EC in the light of 
the case law of the Court’,
28 so that, as a result, ‘a measure that is incompatible 
with Directive 96/71 will, a fortiori, be contrary to Article 49 EC’.
29  On this 
basis, the Directive clarifies the scope of the Article, with the result that the 
facts of Laval fall under them both.   
 
It is relevant to consider which of these four interpretations might be the correct 
one.    If  it  is  the  fourth,  the  scope  of  the  Laval  judgment  can  be  narrowly 
confined to the context provided by the Directive. If it is one of the first three, 
the  Court  is  giving  Article  49  a  very  broad  reading,  as  covering  several 
situations  which  do  not  self-evidently  fall  within  the  express  words  of  the 
article:  situations  where  there  is  no  contractual  nexus  between  the  foreign 
provider and the person for whom the services are intended; where the foreign 
provider acts through a local subsidiary which it controls; and where foreign 
service  provision  might  be  deterred  by  a  given  law  or  practice  on  future 
hypothetical facts. 
 
Let  us  assume  that  the  Court  was  correct,  for  whatever  precise  reason,  in 
treating  the  parent  company  Laval  as  the  relevant  service  provider  for  the 
purposes of Article 49.  In what way did it suffer a competitive disadvantage by 
virtue of its Latvian establishment?  As we have seen, the Court took the view 
that Laval’s freedom to provide services was being infringed by the action taken 
by the Swedish unions because, as a Latvian firm, it employed Latvian workers 
and was subject to Latvian labour law and collective agreements.  However, this 
point  is  by  no  means  as  obvious  as  the  Court  seems  to  have  thought.    A 
company’s establishment has no intrinsic connection with whom it employs, the 
labour laws it is subject to, or the collective agreements which it observes.  Both   9 
under the practice of individual states and under Community law (in the form, 
here,  of  the  Rome  Convention  on  the  law  applicable  to  contractual 
obligations),
30 labour laws are generally applied on a territorial basis; in other 
words, they operate by reference to the normal or habitual place of work of the 
worker (which will override any agreement to the contrary, at least as far as 
mandatory  rules  are  concerned).    By  contrast,  the  tests  for  determining  an 
undertaking’s establishment are not territorial.  Under the rules of the conflict of 
laws in force in various Member States, the establishment of an undertaking 
depends either on the site of its head office or on its jurisdiction of incorporation, 
that  is  to  say,  the  jurisdiction  under  which  its  members  have  chosen  to 
incorporate it.  It is not dependent on where it carries out most of its activities 
(this may or  may  not be the same place as the  location of its head office).  
Under  Community  law,  a  slightly  more  expansive  test  of  ‘establishment’ 
applies; this refers to ‘the actual pursuit of an economic activity through a fixed 
establishment in another Member State for an indefinite period’.
31  But again, a 
company’s physical presence on a given territory is not a necessary condition 
for  being  established  there.  Thanks  to  Centros  and  related  judgments,
32 an 
undertaking may now choose to incorporate in a state entirely separate from that 
in which it does business; attempts to constrain this right of free incorporation, 
such as the ‘real seat’ principle which applies in a number of civil law systems, 
are subject to strict controls in the sense that they must pass a high justification 
threshold.    Centros  concerned  the  right  of  a  company  which  operated  (or 
proposed to operate) on Danish territory to incorporate itself under English law.  
As a consequence of that ruling, there are now several thousand firms which 
operate  on  the  territory  of  continental  European  jurisdictions,  employing 
workers under the terms of labour legislation in force in those countries, but 
which are incorporated under English law.
33   
 
Laval’s supposed disadvantage in being subject to Swedish law and to industrial 
action aimed at getting it to sign a collective agreement was only in the most 
tenuous sense the result of its Latvian establishment.  It was principally the 
result of its decision to employ Latvian workers on the Vaxholm contract.  This 
was a decision it presumably took in the light of an assessment of its business 
interests, but it in no sense followed from it being a Latvian company.  There is 
no  principle  of  either  national  law  or  Community  law  which  states  that  an 
undertaking  established  in  a  particular  Member  State  must  employ  only 
nationals of that state when posting them overseas, or otherwise; nor may it 
decide to do so to the exclusion of workers from other Member States, as this 
would amount to discrimination on the grounds of nationality, (probably) under 
Article 39.  The same point applies to Laval’s signature of a Latvian collective 
agreement: its Latvian establishment imposes no obligation upon it to sign such   10
an agreement.  Its decision to do so was entirely voluntary (and was taken only 
when its negotiations with the Swedish unions had broken down).   
 
Laval extends the scope of Article 49 and, by extension, Article 43, which uses 
the same formula of ‘restriction’, to cases where the transnational element is 
marginal or tangential to the dispute at issue.  In Laval the party to the dispute, 
although  a  foreign  company,  was  not  contracted  to  supply  the  service  in 
question (Baltic was the service supplier); as we have seen, this did not make 
any  difference  to  the  Court’s  ruling.    Thus  service  providers  from  low-cost 
states can access the territory of other states via subsidiaries incorporated in 
those states, while still retaining the benefit of the laws of their country of origin.  
In Rüffert, where the foreign provider was contracted to supply the services 
concerned, it was not a party to the dispute before the court.  Rüffert therefore 
shows that an employer established in the host state can invoke Article 49 to 
disapply labour laws which indirectly affect its profitability by virtue of their 
impact on a foreign service provider upstream in the chain of supply.   
 
But  Laval  goes  beyond  cases  involving  (even  tangentially)  foreign  service 
provision.    This  is  because  of  the  way  Articles  49  and  43  interact.    Under 
Article 43, thanks to Centros, an undertaking has a very wide freedom of choice 
over the nationality of its establishment; companies can be incorporated under 
the  legal  regime  which  their  members  consider  most  amenable,  with  other 
Member States being required to pass a high threshold of justification if they 
wish to deny this choice.  Moreover, the test of what counts as a ‘restriction’ on 
freedom of establishment under Article 43, as both Centros and Viking make 
clear,  is  similar  to  that  which  applies  to  freedom  to  supply  services  under 
Article 49.  Laval, Viking and Centros together open up new possibilities of 
employers  accessing  low-cost  labour  law  regimes.    Consider  the  following 
examples: 
 
(1)  A  Latvian  company  is  considering  investing  in  a  new 
manufacturing  site  in  Sweden.    It  proposes  to  rely  on  Latvian 
labour law and collective agreements in its relations with Swedish 
unions and the workers they represent.  It argues that Swedish law 
should  be  disapplied  in  order  to  prevent  it  being  deterred  from 
making the investment. 
 
(2) A British company wants to supply consulting services to firms 
in Germany.  It employs workers in Germany through a German 
subsidiary but with contracts of employment governed by UK law.  
When  the  subsidiary  dismisses  the  workers  on  the  grounds  of 
redundancy, it seeks to have German labour legislation disapplied   11
in  favour  of  UK  law,  on  the  grounds  that  the  latter  is  less 
‘restrictive’ of the employer’s power to make redundancies. 
 
(3) The same facts as (2), but the parent company this time is a 
German one which wants to supply consulting services to firms 
based in the UK. 
 
In each of the above examples, there is, conceivably, a Laval-style ‘restriction’ 
on  freedom  of  movement  which  arises  from  the  variations  in  labour  costs 
imposed  by  different  regulatory  regimes,  and  there  is  also  a  transnational 
element to the dispute.  Would it be necessary, in each case, for the application 
of the domestic labour laws in question to be justified by the host Member State 
(bearing in mind that the conditions of justification, if the example of Laval is 
followed, are likely to be very strict)?  Such possibilities seem incompatible 
with the protection previously afforded to the principle of the territorial effect of 
labour legislation by the Rome Convention on the laws applicable to contractual 
obligations, which is due to become the Rome I Regulation shortly.
34  However, 
the  relationship  between  the  Convention,  or  the  soon-to-be  Regulation,  and 
Article  49  is  yet  another  of  the  issues  which  Laval  poses  without  clearly 
answering.  To consider some possible answers it is necessary to look in more 
detail at the Court’s interpretation of the Posting of Workers Directive and to 
consider how far temporary postings may constitute a special case in the context 
both of Article 49 and of the Rome Convention. 
 
3.  Towards  pre-emption?  The  Court’s  interpretation  of  the  Posting  of 
Workers Directive 
Most  labour  law  jurisdictions  give  effect  to  the  ‘principle  of  territoriality’ 
through tests which refer to the ‘habitual’ or ‘normal’ place of work of the 
employee or worker.
35  In Laval, the Court claimed to recognise the principle of 
the territorial application of labour laws, or, at least, to recognize that this had 
provided the basis for a defence of justification in earlier cases:  
 
Community law does not preclude Member States from applying their 
legislation, or collective labour agreements entered into by management 
and labour relating to minimum wages, to any person who is employed, 
even temporarily within their territory, no matter in which country the 
employer is established.
36   
 
In practice, its ruling puts the principle of territoriality in doubt in the one case 
where  it  really  matters,  namely  where  an  employer  seeks  to  have  domestic 
labour laws set aside in order to access a less restrictive regime under the law of 
another Member State.  How could it reach this conclusion?   12
 
The Rome Convention, in Article 6(1), states that ‘in a contract of employment 
a choice of law made by the parties shall not have the result of depriving the 
employee of the protection afforded to him by the mandatory rules of the law 
which would be applicable … in the absence of choice’.  Article 6(2) indicates 
that, in the absence of choice, a contract of employment should be governed ‘by 
the law of the country in which the employee habitually carries out his work, 
even if he is temporarily employed in another country’.  Thus the Convention 
cements  into  place  the  territorial  application  of  mandatory  labour  law  rules, 
requiring its signatories (all the current Member States) to observe the ‘habitual 
work’ test.  As mentioned above, the Rome Convention is in the course of being 
converted  into  a  Community  regulation.
37   The  draft,  known  as  the  Rome  I 
Regulation, restates the rule in Article 6, with two modifications.  It is now 
stated  that  the  mandatory  rules  of  law  of  the  country  ‘in  or  from  which’ 
(emphasis added) the employee habitually works are to apply, a change made in 
order to bring the employment contracts of certain airline and other transport 
workers within the Regulation.  In addition, draft Regulation 6(2)(a) spells out 
in more detail the rules relating to temporary work.  This provision says that, in 
the case of a temporary posting, ‘the place of performance shall not be deemed 
to have changed if [the employee] is temporarily employed in another country’, 
and goes on to give the following definition of temporary work: 
 
Work carried out in another country shall be regarded as temporary if the 
employee is expected to resume working in the country of origin after 
carrying  out  his  tasks  abroad.    The  conclusion  of  a  new  contract  of 
employment with the original employer belonging to the same group of 
companies as the original employer does not preclude the employee from 
being regarded as carrying out his work in another country temporarily. 
 
The basic rule, then, is that labour laws generally have a territorial effect, but 
that in the case of temporary postings, the law of the country of origin applies.  
The temporary posting of workers is, in that sense, a special situation outside 
the normal case of the territorial application of labour laws. 
 
The Posting of Workers Directive,
38 in its turn, carves out an exception to the 
rules contained in the Convention/Regulation, restoring the territorial effect of 
the labour laws of the host state in so far as they apply to posted workers within 
the terms of that Directive.  The Directive requires Member States to apply 
certain mandatory rules of labour law and, in the case of the building industry, 
the terms of certain collective agreements, to workers on temporary postings; in 
other words, the law of the host state must be applied, in preference to the law 
of the home state as specified by the Convention.  The mandatory rules of law   13
which must be applied under Article 3(1)(a)–(g) are listed as those relating to 
working hours, holidays, minimum wages, the conditions of agency-supplied 
labour, health and safety, the protection of pregnancy and maternity, and anti-
discrimination law.
39  The collective agreements which may be applied in the 
building trades are those which ‘have been declared universally applicable’ in 
the  sense  of  being  required  to  be  observed  by  ‘all  undertakings  in  the 
geographical area and in the profession or industry concerned’.  In the absence 
of a power to make collective agreements universally applicable, a Member 
State may instead adopt under Article 3(8) agreements or awards which are 
‘generally applicable’ to all similar undertakings in the industry or geographical 
area concerned, or, agreements made by the ‘most representative’ employers’ 
associations  and  trade  unions  at  national  level  and  which  are  effective 
throughout the national territory concerned.  Finally, Article 3(10) states that a 
Member State may add to the list of mandatory rules of law which must be 
observed  under  Article  3(1)(a)-(g)  (unfair  dismissal  laws,  laws  governing 
employee  representation and those relating to industrial action, for example, 
could come into this category). 
 
In both Laval and Rüffert, the Court focused its attention on the Directive, to an 
even greater extent than on Article 49.  It is not at first sight clear why it did this.  
If Article 49 applied to these cases, and brought with it its own case law on the 
issue of justification, why was it necessary to consider the Directive at all?  The 
provisions of the Directive were not capable, in themselves, of having direct 
effect in a case involving private parties, such as Laval 
40 (Rüffert is different, in 
principle,  as  the  defendant  was  the  regional  government,  although  nothing 
seems to have turned on this, for reasons which will shortly become clear).  In 
Laval  the  Court  itself  simply  stated  that  the  Directive  had  to  be  taken  into 
account when giving a ruling on the meaning of Article 49 in a posting case, 
without saying precisely why, except to refer back to its own earlier case law 
(which is no more informative).
41  The Opinion of Advocate General Mengozzi 
goes into more detail.  As we have already seen, he took the view that the 
Directive is a ‘specific interpretation’ of the Article in the light of the case law 
of the Court, and that it is ‘intended … to implement’ the Article.
42  In other 
words, the Directive gives concrete expression to Article 49.  The Directive can 
accordingly be read as clarifying both the ambit of Article 49 (so as to bring 
within it the facts of Laval, as we saw earlier) and the content of the justification 
defence under that article.  In its turn, Article 49 can be read as throwing light 
on the interpretation of the Directive, as we shall now see. 
 
Article 49, in particular, helps to explain the decision of the Court to give the 
Directive pre-emptive effect,
43 that is to say, an interpretation which rules out 
Member  State  legislation  setting  standards  above  those  provided  for  in  the   14
Directive.  On the face of it, the Directive requires Member States to apply 
certain core labour law rules and, in the case of the building trades, certain 
collective agreements (in principle those having erga omnes effect, that is to say, 
binding  all  employers  in  a  given  trade  and/or  geographical  region)  to  the 
employment of posted workers.  A Member State is not obliged, for example, to 
have  laws  on  minimum  rates  of  pay  or  to  make  provision  for  collective 
agreements to have an erga omnes effect, but if it does, it must extend them to 
postings  coming  under  the  scope  of  the  Directive  otherwise  they  cannot  be 
applied to posted workers.  The Directive also appears, quite explicitly, to say 
that a Member State is allowed to go beyond this core obligation: Article 3(7) of 
the Directive states that the earlier paragraphs of that Article ‘shall not prevent 
application of terms and conditions which are more favourable to workers’ and 
recital 17 of the Directive says the same thing.  Other recitals make it clear that 
the  Directive  fully  recognises  the  principle  of  territoriality  and  the  right  of 
collective action ‘to defend the interests of trades and professions’.
44 
 
Despite all this, on several occasions in Laval and Rüffert the Court states that 
the Directive merely empowers Member States to act: ‘[A]s regards the matters 
referred  to  in  Article  3(1),  first  subparagraph  (a)  to  (g),  Directive  96/71 
expressly  lays  down  the  degree  of  protection  for  workers  of  undertakings 
established in other Member States who are posted to the territory of the host 
Member State which the latter State is entitled to require those undertakings to 
observe’
45 (emphasis added).  To say that the Member State is entitled to act is a 
strange way to refer to the effect of a Directive which is intended to create 
binding standards.  Member States, the Court says, can go this far and no further, 
notwithstanding  Article  3(7)  and  recital  17.    These  provisions  ‘cannot  be 
interpreted as allowing the host Member State to make the provision of services 
in  its  territory  conditional  upon  the  observance  of  terms  and  conditions  of 
employment which go beyond the mandatory rules for minimum protection’ 
since this ‘would amount to depriving the directive of its effectiveness’.
46  In 
other words, the Directive has the ‘pre-emptive’ effect of ruling out all state 
action which departs from its provisions. 
 
The Posting of Workers Directive could reasonably have been interpreted, prior 
to Laval, as allowing variation of state practice above the floor of mandatory 
terms and conditions.  That is not just what the Directive, in so many words, 
clearly  indicates;  it  is  an  interpretation  consistent  with  the  widely  accepted 
understanding of other social policy directives and regulations, which do not 
seek to set out either uniform laws or even a level playing field, but to establish 
a floor of rights above which regulatory competition is possible.
47  Given the 
clear  wording  of  the  Directive  and  the  wider  institutional  context  of  social 
policy in which it is set, how can the Court’s view in Laval be explained?  What   15
the  Court  appears  to  be  saying  is  that  action  taken  by  a  Member  State  in 
compliance with the Directive is permitted in the sense of being justified within 
Article 49.  The Directive spells out what amounts to justification in both a 
positive and a negative sense—it tells us what is possible, but also what the 
limits of state action are.   
 
What is the purpose which the Court sees as being frustrated if a Member State 
goes beyond what the Directive requires?  Presumably (although yet again this 
is not made clear) the Court takes the view, notwithstanding passing references 
to other objectives,
48 that the principal purpose of the Directive is to protect the 
rights of service providers.  In Laval it referred to the Directive serving ‘the 
interests of the employers and their personnel’.
49  The Court’s interpretation of 
the Directive can be seen as protecting employers in two ways: by ensuring that 
their labour law obligations beyond the core of protective rights identified in the 
Directive  are  minimised;  and/or  by  making  more  certain  and  consistent  the 
content of the laws applying to posted workers across the different Member 
States.   
 
The first of these interpretations implies that the Directive had, as one of its 
goals, the exemption of foreign service providers from those rules and standards, 
beyond the core, which apply to home-state employers.  It is by no means clear 
that the Court did not regard this as a legitimate role for the Directive, but if that 
is  the  case,  its  implications  for  regulatory  competition  are  far-reaching:  the 
Directive is to be read as requiring, in the context of foreign service provision, 
the labour standards of low-cost home states to be directly translated on to the 
territory of host states, a form of legally mandated social arbitrage in which 
labour law regimes are placed in direct competition with each other.  It is one 
thing to allow such arbitrage, another to mandate it.   
 
If the second of these objectives was the Court’s objective, it is aiming at an 
illusory target: uniformity of laws can never be achieved through the Directive.  
Diversity will inevitably remain even under Laval, since the Directive does not 
require Member States to adopt laws on each one of the matters listed in Article 
3(1), and several of them do not have, for example, statutory minimum wages; 
nor does it require the level of the substantive standards to be harmonised.  The 
Directive cannot sensibly be said to be aiming at either a single legal regime for 
posting across the Union, or a level playing field in terms of costs. 
 
How  can  the  Court’s  interpretation  be  seen  as  protecting  the  interests  of 
‘personnel’?
50  The immediate effect of its ruling is that posted workers may not 
benefit any longer from protections beyond the core laid down in the Directive, 
even if other employees working on the territory of the home state do so.
51    16
Perhaps the Court thought that it was protecting their interests, in the sense that 
they would more easily find work if they were exempted from the labour laws 
of the host state; or perhaps it took the line that they would benefit from there 
being greater certainty over the terms which applied to their work.  A more 
conventional  understanding  of  the  Directive,  and  one  which  was  widely 
believed to be correct prior to Laval, is that it was intended to confer labour law 
rights and the benefit of collective agreements on posted workers, not to remove 
such  protections  from  them  on  the  grounds  that  this  would  enhance  their 
employability.
52   
 
In favour of the Court’s interpretation in Laval, the Directive’s Treaty base is to 
be found in the free movement provisions of the Treaty,
53 not its social policy 
provisions.  But this in itself need not require a conclusion that the Directive’s 
principal purpose is to protect service providers rather than their workers.  It is 
possible  to  see  the  Directive  as  striking  a  balance  between  the  interests  of 
employers, posted workers and host-state employees in a way which serves to 
legitimise  the  posting  of  workers  and  thereby  facilitating  the  cross-border 
supply of services in a broad sense.
54  Nor does the Directive’s Treaty base 
justify giving the Directive a pre-emptive effect.  Although recent social policy 
directives have been adopted under the powers put in place for this purpose 
under the Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties, earlier directives on equal pay 
and employment protection were adopted under general powers for the internal 
market powers, without being interpreted as setting maximum standards.
55  The 
Court’s interpretation of the Directive is supported not so much by the specific 
argument concerning its Treaty base but, more generally, by the claim that it is a 
‘specific interpretation’
56 of Article 49; on that basis, its interpretation should be 
informed by Article 49’s purpose of protecting freedom of movement.  We saw 
earlier that the Directive was needed in order to bring Laval within Article 49 in 
the first place;
57 Article 49, in its turn, supplied the context for the Court’s pre-
emptive reading of the Directive.   
 
Can  the  existence  of  provisions  in  the  Directive  itself  spelling  out  certain 
specific circumstances under which a Member State may go beyond the core be 
read  as  preventing  other  more  favourable  measures?    Article  3(8)  allows  a 
Member  State,  where  it  does  not  have  a  mechanism  for  giving  collective 
agreements universal effect, to extend to posted workers the terms of collective 
agreements which are ‘generally applicable’ or which are agreed by the most 
representative  employers  associations  and  trade  unions  and  are  applied 
throughout  the  national  territory.    Sweden  did  not  take  advantage  of  this 
provision for the reason that it does not have a procedure for doing either of 
these  two  things;  therefore  it  took  the  view  that  to  make  their  application 
mandatory for posted workers would be to impose an unequal burden on them   17
by comparison to domestic employers.
58  Article 3(10) allows a Member State 
to  add  to  the  ‘core’  matters  not  listed  in  Article  3(1)  which  fall  under  the 
definition of ‘public policy provisions’.  According to the Court, however, the 
insurance payments which Laval would have been required to make if it had 
signed the building sector collective agreement could not be defended under this 
provision because that agreement was made by private parties who were not 
‘bodies governed by public law’ and so could not, for that reason, cite ‘grounds 
of public policy’ to bring themselves under Article 3(10).  Thus under both 
Article  3(8)  and  Article  3(10),  the  Court  gave  the  Directive  both  a  highly 
prescriptive and a very narrow interpretation, one which requires a Member 
State to go down a legislative route and which rules out implementation through 




In Rüffert the Court held that a law (the Landesvergabegesetz) which allowed 
the Land of Lower Saxony to give mandatory effect to a sectoral collective 
agreement  governing  public  sector  employment  (but  not  the  private  sector) 
could not be read as a measure implementing the Directive since it ‘[did] not fix 
a minimum rate of pay according to the procedures laid down in the first and 
second  indents  of  the  first  subparagraph  of  Article  3(1)  and  in  the  second 
subparagraph  of  Article  3(8))’.  In  other  words,  a  law  which  did  not  fall 
precisely within the terms of Article 3, even though it had the aim of protecting 
both  domestic  and  posted  workers  and  ensuring  fair  competition  between 
undertakings, could not be regarded as an implementing measure.
60  The Court 
then went on to find that the Landesvergabegesetz failed under Article 49, since 
it imposed an additional economic burden ‘on service providers established in 
another Member State where minimum rates of pay are lower’
61 which could 
not be justified because there was ‘no evidence to support the conclusion that 
the  protection  resulting  from  such  a  rate  of  pay  …  is  necessary  for  a 
construction worker only when he is employed in the context of a public works 
contract but not when he is employed in the context of a private contract’.
 62  In 
Rüffert,  there  were  none  of  the  factors  which  could  possibly  be  seen  as 
persuading the Court to take a strict narrow of the justification defence in Laval.  
There  was  no  strike  action  and  no  uncertainty  over  the  rate  of  pay  which 
employers (foreign or domestic) were being expected to observe.  There was, 
straightforwardly enough, a law which extended a collective agreement with a 
specific sectoral and regional reach and which went above the lower minimum 
level of pay set out in the national collective agreement for the construction 
industry as a whole.  The Court deemed this protection to be unjustified on the 
basis that it went beyond the bare minimum set out in the national agreement.  
In effect, the Court was saying, protection is ‘unnecessary’ wherever it goes 
beyond the lowest level provided by law in the host state.     18
 
The Court’s pre-emptive interpretation of the Directive may have little impact 
outside posting cases.  Most other social policy directives are not affected by the 
context provided by Article 49 in Laval.  They have Treaty-bases in the Social 
Policy  Title  and  they  cannot  in  any  sense  be  said  to  be  interpretations  or 
expressions of Article 49 or any of the other free movement provisions of the 
Treaty.   
 
It is also possible that the principle of regime portability which emerges from 
Laval only applies in posting cases.  In Laval the Court interpreted the Posting 
Directive as allowing the host state to apply the principle of territoriality only 
up to the point strictly required by that Directive.  This was compatible with the 
Rome  Convention  since,  under  that  measure  (and  under  the  draft  Rome  I 
Regulation),  the  applicable  law  of  the  contract  of  employment  of  a  posted 
worker will normally be that of the home state.  However, as we have seen, in 
other cases the principle of territoriality applies—the rule set out in the Rome 
Convention (and retained in the draft Regulation) is that the choice of law made 
in the employment contract may not deprive the employee of the protection of 
the mandatory rules of law of the state in which the employee habitually works.  
How does this fit with the broad notion of ‘restriction’ in Article 49 (and, by 
extension, Article 43)?  One possibility is that the Rome I Regulation will be 
read, as the Posting Directive was in Laval, as providing a specific answer to the 
question of what a Member State is allowed to do by way of the justification 
defence under Articles 43 and 49: it may do what the Rome Regulation (when it 
is adopted) requires it to do, and no more.  If it goes further, it risks infringing 
freedom of movement rights.   
 
This  may  offer  a  resolution  to  the  issues  raised  by  the  hypothetical  cases 
considered  at  the  end  of  section  II,  above:  in  each  case,  the  principle  of 
territoriality would prevail.  But this is far from clear.  The conflict rules set out 
in  the  Rome  Convention  (and  draft  Regulation)  are  stated  to  be  without 
prejudice  to  the  application  or  adoption  of  rules  designed  to  promote  the 
operation of the internal market,
63 and they could in any event be disapplied if 
they  were  found  to  be  contravention  of  a  Treaty  provision  protecting  a 
fundamental right, as is the case with the free movement provisions.  It is too 
early to rule out the wider application, beyond posting cases, of the principle of 
regime portability. 
 
4. The wider institutional context: state powers, federal controls, and social 
policy 
If Laval’s broad reading of the test of ‘restriction’ in the law on free movement, 
coupled  with  its  rigid  interpretation  of  the  Posting  Directive,  is  followed  in   19
future cases, it will turn out to have marked a fundamental shift in the nature of 
the relationship between Community law and the law of the Member States.  Up 
to this point, there has been an uneasy compromise between federal tendencies 
and state rights in the labour law field: the principal responsibility for making 
labour law rules has remained with the states, with only limited harmonization 
through  directives  and  regulations,  and  a  narrowly  framed  role  for  free 
movement and competition law in ensuring that state initiatives did not obstruct 
the  operation  of  the  internal  market.    This  compromise  originated  in  the 
preparatory documents for the Treaty of Rome, including the Spaak Report, 
which rejected arguments for a European-wide labour code as misconceived.  
Differences in labour regulation across the Member States would not, in and of 
themselves, give rise to a distortion of the common market, nor should they be 
regarded without more as partitioning or segmenting the market on national 
lines.
64   Variations  in  nominal  wage  costs  and  in  social  and  fiscal  charges 
largely  reflected  differences  in  productivity  and  could  be  accommodated  by 
national exchange rate fluctuations.  A ‘distortion’ only arose in cases where 
particular industries within a given Member State were able to tap into a pool of 
low-cost labour which was not open to firms based elsewhere.  Within-country 
variations  of  this  sort  would  not  be  eliminated  by  differences  in  national 
exchange rates.
65  Where cheap labour became available to producers by virtue 
of the absence of regulation in a given Member State, a harmonizing measure 
might be justified.  This was the (rather tenuous) market-related justification 
given
66 for the adoption of the principle of equal pay between women and men 
which became Article 119 of the Rome Treaty (now Article 141 EC).   
 
In the mid-1950s, all of the Member States were committed to the maintenance 
of  strong  welfare  states  and  the  use  of  legal  means  to  underpin  collective 
bargaining.  Most of them had adopted post-war constitutions which recognized 
the existence of fundamental social rights on a par with (or at least broadly 
equivalent to) civil and political rights.  Cost levels in the national economies of 
the  original  six  Member  States  were  also  broadly  aligned.      Under  these 
conditions, it was plausible for the Spaak Report to believe that a leveling-up of 
wage  and  social  standards  would  follow  from  the  operation  of  the  common 
market, without the need for labour law harmonization.  Competition between 
the Member States to attract and retain skilled labour and productive capital 
would ensure a ‘race to the top’.  This position was not greatly altered by the 
later adoption, from the 1970s onwards, of directives and regulations in the 
labour law field.  These measures only touched on a small part of the range of 
topics covered by labour legislation at state level and the standards they set out 
were,  in  any  event,  expressed  as  ‘floors’  not  ‘ceilings’,  so  no  issue  of  pre-
emption  arose.
67   The  Member  States  were  free  to  engage  in  regulatory 
competition  above  the  ‘floor’  and,  to  the  extent  that  they  did  so,   20
experimentation was encouraged.
68  From the mid-1990s onwards most labour 
law  directives  were  flexible  or  ‘reflexive’  in  form,  allowing  Member  States 
considerable leeway in adjusting Community law norms to national conditions 
and opening up a space for implementation through collective bargaining, while 
the  changes  made  by  the  Maastricht  and  Amsterdam  Treaties  fostered  the 
emergence  of  transnational  social  dialogue  as  a  new  source  of  labour  law 
rules.
69   In  these  various  ways,  developments  in  labour  law  anticipated  the 
emphasis on experimentalism
70 and ‘learning through difference’
71 which has 
more recently been associated with the ‘soft law’ approach of the open method 
of coordination in its various forms. 
 
Spaak’s specific arguments against harmonization in the labour law field no 
longer  hold;  the  arrival  of  the  euro  has  meant  the  end  of  exchange  rate 
flexibility for a majority of the Member States, with most of the rest heading in 
the same direction, while the enlargement of the Union has meant that nominal 
cost levels are no longer closely aligned across national borders.  But Spaak’s 
wider  approach  to  the  question  of  how  Community  law  should  define  the 
contours of the common (now single) market is still defensible.  Few now argue 
for the use of harmonizing measures to put in place a comprehensive European 
labour code; the argument for diversity and experimentation has become widely 
accepted.    But  Spaak  also  concluded  that  there  was no  compelling  case  for 
uniform  labour  laws  on  what  would  now  be  called  single  market  grounds.  
Laval  gives  the  impression  that  these  debates  had  never  happened.    In  his 
Opinion,  Advocate  General  Mengozzi  rather  grudgingly  recommended  that 
Sweden be allowed to retain a system based on collective bargaining rather than 
direct legislative control for the reason that it was too late to do anything about 
it: ‘I do not think that, at its present stage of development, Community law can 
encroach  upon  that  approach  to  employment  relationships  through  the 
application of one of the fundamental freedoms of movement provided for in 
the  Treaty’.
72   Given  the  way  in  which  it  was  expressed,  it  is  perhaps  not 
surprising that this less than ringing endorsement of state autonomy failed to 
convince the Court. 
 
Laval’s approach to pre-emption, if more widely followed, would put an end to 
regulatory competition ‘above the floor’ and institute a regime of uniform laws 
in the areas where directives set mandatory standards: Member States would not 
be allowed to depart at all from the content of the Community law standard.  
Outside the areas where directive or regulations were already in place, Laval 
would  have  a  strongly  deregulatory  effect:  regime  portability,  if  it  extended 
beyond  the  posting  issue,  would  allow  firms  to  access  low-cost  labour  law 
systems even on the territory of other states.  This would directly undermine the 
functioning  of  labour  law  rules  designed  to  set  in place  a  floor  of rights  at   21
national level.  As we have seen, regime portability Laval-style is not confined 
to foreign employers; domestic employers can invoke it as well to have national 
laws disapplied wherever there is a transnational dimension to a dispute, which 
there will be if, at some (possibly distant) point, a foreign provider is involved 
in  the  chain  of  production  or  supply.    In  any  case,  thanks  to  Centros
73 and 
related case law, there is considerable leeway for companies to change their seat 
of incorporation or take other steps to access the company law regimes of other 
Member States through subsidiaries, thereby gaining a foreign establishment 
which  will  enable  them  to  trigger  Articles  43  and  49.    More  generally,  the 
combined effect of widening the basis of judicial review of national-level laws 
and practices while at the same time limiting the grounds of justification and 
restricting the margin of appreciation available to Member States in the labour 
law field would most likely be to undermine the effectiveness with which labour 
standards, whether originating in law or in collective agreements, can be applied 
at national level.  Laval and Rüffert have already led to questions being raised 
about the legality of ‘living wage’ laws which seek to guarantee wages which 
are  consistent  with  the  local  cost  of  living  for  workers  employed  on  large 
construction  projects,  such  as  those  relating  to  the  2012  Olympic  Games  in 
London.
74  High-cost states will find themselves not simply undercut by lower 
standards in other countries, but unable even to apply their own legislation on 
their national territory.  For these various reasons, in areas where there is no 
Community-level labour law standard and Member States possess, in principle, 
full autonomy of action, Laval seems liable to induce, in practice, ‘defensive 
regulatory competition’, or a ‘race to the bottom’.   
 
Such  an  outcome  had  been  carefully  avoided  in  previous  decisions  on  the 
interface between labour law and free movement, largely through the use of the 
justification defence and the associated proportionality test.
75  After Laval, that 
option no longer seems an effective way of protecting state autonomy.  Too 
much turns on the application of a proportionality test which invites the courts 
to engage in ad hoc, subjective judgments on the appropriateness of regulatory 
action.
76  This raises the question of whether a more fundamental reappraisal of 
the scope of free movement law is required.   
 
The central issue here is the meaning of the term ‘restriction’ in Article 49 (and, 
by extension, Article 43).  One plausible line of attack on Laval is that the test 
of  restriction  which  it  adopts  is  over-inclusive.    This  is  particularly  so  if  a 
restriction is simply taken to be the presence of any regulatory law, whether or 
not it is equally applicable to home-state and host-state providers; but even if a 
more  narrow  definition  is  used,  which  refers  to  differences  in  regulation 
between the home and host states, the test is too broad.  As we have seen, the 
law of the internal market, from its very early beginnings in the Spaak Report,   22
took the view that uniform laws were not needed for a transnational market to 
function.  The Court has accepted this point in other areas of internal market 
law.
77  In Weigel
78 it held that Article 39 could not be invoked to strike down a 
fuel consumption tax chargeable at the point when a vehicle was first registered 
in a Member State.  It was claimed that the tax amounted to a restriction on 
freedom of movement, and the Court held that it was indeed ‘likely to have a 
negative bearing on the decision of migrant workers to exercise their right to 
freedom of movement’;
79 however it went on to hold that such a ‘disadvantage, 
by comparison with the situation in which the worker pursued his activities 
prior to the transfer, is not contrary to Art. 39 EC if that legislation does not 
place that worker at a disadvantage as compared with those who were already 
subject to it’.
80  In Graf
81 the Court rejected a claim that Article 39 entitled a 
worker migrating from one Member State to another to receive severance pay 
which  he  would  have  received  at  the  end  of  his  employment  had  he  not 
voluntarily left to take up employment in the other Member State, Advocate 
General Fennelly commenting that ‘the migrant worker must take the national 
employment market as he finds it’.
82   
 
Thus there is no basis in Community law for a principle of regime portability in 
favour of workers – in other words, a worker moving from a more to a less 
regulative member state cannot insist on taking the protection of the labour law 
of the state of origin with them. This is precisely the converse of Laval, where 
an employer moving from a less regulative state to a more regulative one was 
entitled to the protection (from its point of view) of the (weak) labour law of the 
country of origin.  It is not at all surprising that the claims in Weigel and Graf 
were  rejected;  the  Court’s  decisions  in  these  cases  were  consistent  with  the 
philosophy  which  has  informed  internal  market  law  since  the  Spaak  report.  
What is surprising, in the context of such decisions, is that Laval was decided 
the  way  it  was.  Narrowing  the  definition  of  ‘restriction’,  as  in  Graf,  would 
provides  one  possible  escape  route  for  the  Court  in  future  should  the  full 
consequences of Laval turn out to be hard to swallow.
83 
 
Another  route  for  the  Court  is  to  develop  a  more  nuanced  account  of  the 
circumstances  under  which  regulatory  diversity  poses  an  obstacle  to  market 
integration.  This is a more difficult step to take as it requires the Court to 
articulate  a  theory  of  how  regulatory  competition  works  and  under  what 
circumstances  Community-law  intervention  is  necessary  in  order  to  avoid  a 
destructive breakdown of cooperation between the Member States.  Clearly, one 
instance in which intervention is needed is where there is discrimination, against 
goods, services, persons and so on, on the grounds of nationality, but it is not 
the only one.  Market partitioning is another case and a third could be the idea 
of ‘cost externalization’, or measures taken by one Member State which have   23
the effect of displacing costs on to another and which thereby give rise to the 
risk of retaliatory action.  These are concepts familiar from American case-law 
and doctrinal writing on the interpretation of the dormant Commerce Clause
84 
(the equivalent, in this context to free movement rules) but they have so far 
made little impact on the discussion in Community law.
85  
 
Doctrinal flexibility can also be achieved on the question of the interpretation of 
directives.  In its rigid analysis of the Posting Directive, Laval is reminiscent of 
late-nineteenth and early twentieth-century pre-emption decisions of the United 
State Supreme  Court, which ruled that  state  autonomy  was displaced across 
large areas of regulatory activity by the presence of federal laws even in cases 
where there was no clear conflict between them.
86  From the 1930s onwards, the 
Supreme  Court  shifted  its  position  as  part  of  the  wider  realignment  of 
constitutional law which took place as a result of the acceptance of the legality 
of the regulatory legislation of the New Deal.  It took the view that the issue of 
pre-emption  was  essentially  one  of  Congressional  intent,  and  that  federal 
statutes should be carefully construed in the context of a presumption against 
pre-emption.
87  Had this approach been taken in Laval it is likely that a different 
result would have been reached, given the clear expression, at several points in 
that Directive, of an anti- pre-emptive intent.
88  This is an issue which will recur 
if other social policy directives come to be interpreted against the backdrop of 
the Court’s free movement jurisprudence. 
 
5. Conclusion 
This paper has considered the implications of Laval for regulatory competition 
in  the  European  Union.    Prior  to  Laval,  the  Member  States  could  engage 
regulatory competition in the labour law field above a floor of rights set by 
Community  law  mainly  via  directives.    Laval  gives  the  Posting  of  Workers 
Directive a ‘pre-emptive’ effect, reading it, contrary to its own clearly expressed 
intent, as if it were a ceiling not a floor.  The justification for doing this is that 
the Directive gives expression to Article 49 EC, and, therefore, protects above 
all the interests of service providers, rather than those of workers, either their 
own employees or those employed elsewhere.  Article 49, in turn, was given an 
exceptionally broad scope in Laval, as applying to all cases of restriction on 
freedom of movement which stem from laws which, on what is perhaps the 
most plausible interpretation, give rise to differences in regulatory standards 
across Member States.  Laval therefore points towards a principle of regime 
portability, which would enable service providers and other employers to access 
the  least  regulative  regime  of  the  Member  States  with  which  they  had  a 
connection.  In effect, this is a country of origin principle discovered not within 
the Service Directive but in the core of Article 49 itself.  It is not clear how far 
this logic extends beyond posting cases or how far regime portability, in the   24
sense just described, is compatible with the rules of the Rome Convention (soon 
to be the Rome I Regulation) on the applicable law of contracts of employment.  
However, it is clear from Laval that the courts now have a greatly extended 
power  to  review  state-level  regulations  (and,  by  extension,  collective 
agreements  and  other  private  arrangements  with  regulatory  effect)  and  to 
subject them to a strict justification test.  Laval displaces a framework of rules 
which had a clear upward bias in favour of regulation, in the sense that member 
states could go above the floor set by a directive but not below it and were 
otherwise more or less free to adopt whatever labour law they liked, with one 
which has a clearly deregulatory tendency. 
 
Laval  is  not  simply  inconsistent  with  the  recent  move  towards  the 
encouragement of experimentalist approaches to governance in the European 
Union,  through  such  techniques  as  ‘reflexive  harmonisation’  and  the  open 
method of coordination; in its over-inclusive definition of what amounts to a 
‘restriction’ on or ‘distortion’ of the internal market it ignores carefully drawn 
distinctions which go back to the Spaak Report itself.  European law urgently 
needs to develop a more nuanced theory of regulatory competition, one which is 
capable of identifying more precisely the grounds (which could include not just 
discrimination but also partitioning and cost-externalisation) on which courts 
can review national laws and practices on the grounds of their incompatibility 
with the operation of the internal market. 
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